Francisco Marí has been working since 2009 as a project officer for lobby and advocacy work in the areas of Global Nutrition, Agricultural Trade and Maritime Policy at Brot für die Welt (Bread for the World), focusing on food security, artisanal fisheries, the WTO, EU-Africa trade and fisheries agreements, deep-sea mining and the effects of food standards on small-scale producers.

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WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies – progress with many open questions

After more than 20 years of negotiations among over 160 countries, the new WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (“Fish I”) has recently entered into force. According to Fish I, the WTO Member States may no longer subsidise any illegal fishing. Our author looks at how substantial this new “standard” is in reality and where gaps remain.

By Francisco Marí

With the entering into force of Fish I on the 15th September 2025 States are required to submit reports on fisheries subsidies to the World Trade Organization’s newly established Committee on Fisheries Subsidies, in addition to their longstanding annual notification obligations under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (in force since 1995). The aim behind these new reporting obligations is to use transparency and oversight, particularly with respect to large industrial fishing fleets, to reduce incentives for IUU fishing and overfishing.

What is regulated …

These reporting requirements apply in principle to all Member States that have acceded to the Agreement, albeit in a gradual manner. In this context, three different groups of developing countries have been established to uphold the WTO principle of Special and Differential Treatment. For those countries that have not ratified the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, such as India or Morocco, the provisions do not apply.

The Agreement primarily targets subsidies to fishing vessels that are proven to be engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)fishing. Government support for fisheries in already overexploited areas or in unregulated parts of the high seas can no longer be granted. In accordance with Article 8.3, WTO Members that have joined the Agreement must yearly report all the relevant forms of support to the dedicated committee. The goal is to mitigate incentives for IUU fishing and overfishing, especially by large fleets, through enhanced transparency and monitoring.

… and what remains unaddressed

However, all subsidies for which no direct causal link to IUU fishing or fishing in already overfished areas can be established remain permissible, including government assistance that drives overcapacity and overfishing. Furthermore, “non-specific” subsidies such as tax exemptions on fuel (e.g. VAT exemptions) continue to be allowed, even if they serve to further increase the windfall profits from IUU fishing.

The reasoning behind the non-inclusion of fuel subsidies under the agreement is that, as defined under the WTO Agreement, this tax exemption qualifies as a subsidy that is “non-specific”. That is, fuel tax exemption is not granted “specifically” to fishing vessels, rather, it applies to all ships operating in international waters, including merchant and cruise ships. This particular WTO logic clearly benefits industrial fishing fleets, and particularly the distant-water fleets, which have much higher fuel consumption. Given that fuel subsidies can account for 30 to 50 per cent of total operating costs in fisheries, they represent a significant advantage.

Transparency gaps

On the other hand, efforts to achieve greater transparency are limited by the wording of Article 8.1 of the Agreement. States are only required “to the extent possible” to report detailed information to the WTO – such relevant vessels, fleets and catch data. In practice, however, major fishing countries can invoke data protection, national practices or lack of detailed records to submit only aggregate notifications or even withhold information altogether. This results in significant transparency gaps, making targeted control or enforcement often impossible.

For example, the absence of an obligation for major fishing nations such as China, South Korea, European Union Member States or Russia to provide detailed annual disclosures on which vessels receive subsidies, in what amounts, and for how long, will make it impossible for countries affected by illegal fishing from these fleets to initiate WTO dispute proceedings. This is because there are no required reporting lists that specify subsidised vessels. Consequently, no action can be taken under the subsidy prohibition provisions of the Agreement. As long as States can withhold subsidy data for individual vessels under Article 8.3, citing confidentiality or national practices, the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement risks being ineffective.

Missing sanctioning power

To oversee subsidy notifications from WTO Members, a “Committee on Fisheries Subsidies” has been established. Here, States – and, indirectly, NGOs and fisheries associations – can raise questions about national subsidy notifications and demand improvements, such as regarding incomplete disclosure or opaque beneficiary structures. However, this committee itself does not have any sanctioning power. Consequences only arise if a WTO dispute settlement procedure is launched and successfully pursued. The complainant does not have to be a country directly affected by IUU fishing; any WTO Member may bring a complaint against another Member suspected of violating the Agreement ­– e.g. by awarding subsidies to IUU fishing. Yet under the current US blockade of the WTO Appellate Body, this process cannot be completed, so even successful complainants cannot enforce sanctions – typically the suspension of trade benefits.

Consequences for developing countries and small-scale fisheries

For developing countries with numerous islands and extensive coastlines, where artisanal and small-scale fisheries play a critical role for both the economy and food security, the new Agreement is a double-edged sword.

Any country (such as Vietnam or the Philippines) that produces more than 0.8 per cent of the global fish catch is, after two years, subject to the same, stricter reporting and control requirements as those States with large industrial fleets. Even if their own fleets are barely involved in IUU fishing or overfishing, these developing countries must make substantial administrative efforts to comply with Article 8. This results in a heavy bureaucratic burden, often overwhelming for local administrations. Indonesia, for example, has nearly 600,000 small fishing boats, many propelled by oars or sails rather than motors, and many unregistered or landing catches without reporting catch areas or quantities. Such unregistered catches supply part of daily food intake, yet thousands could suddenly lose state support simply due to a lack of registration.

It is therefore understandable that thousands of small-scale fishers in resource-rich developing countries fear that their governments may forgo aid for small-scale fishing altogether, rather than set up a burdensome bureaucracy just to document and report to the WTO “subsidies” worth only a few hundred euros per vessel per year. The small consolation offered by the “richer Members” of the WTO – such as Germany or Japan – of establishing a fund to help developing countries meet their reporting obligations does little to alleviate these concerns.

There is no doubt that the main beneficiaries of the Agreement are the industrial fishing fleets and state-subsidised distant-water vessels in China, the EU, South Korea, Japan and Russia. These fleets can continue to access fuel subsidies, energy discounts and modernisation aid, provided there is no direct evidence of involvement in IUU fishing.

Opportunities for greater transparency and peer pressure

Nevertheless, there are new opportunities. For the first time, there is a global obligation to report at least certain relevant subsidies. Developing countries and NGOs can now raise critical questions before the WTO Committee and demand improvements from major fishing nations. This exerts peer pressure on States like China or the EU to transparently and fully report all subsidies as required by Article 8.3 – and, step by step, to enact further improvements.

The Agreement also contains a so-called “sunset clause”: after four years, it will automatically expire unless WTO Members agree to an extension or tighter disciplines, such as those planned under the “Fisheries II” Agreement. These should tackle overcapacity and overfishing.

This 4-year period is therefore both an opportunity and a risk. It can increase political pressure to finally address non-specific subsidies, overcapacity and fairer control rules for small-scale fisheries. Yet it also poses the danger that, if political deadlock continues, the Agreement could simply expire, and everything would be reset to zero.

Summing up

The new WTO Agreement is an important and long-awaited step towards enhanced sustainability and fairness in global fisheries. This legal text marks a historic effort toward regulating harmful subsidies, but its implementation reveals major challenges, especially in transparency, fair burden-sharing and the protection of small-scale fisheries in developing countries.

For the next steps, key challenges remain. A comprehensive disclosure of all subsidies is imperative, especially for industrial fleets and unspecific support measures such as tax exemptions for fuel. For small-scale fisheries in developing countries, differentiated and simple exemptions are needed. The EU and other major actors should demonstrate leadership and, in the upcoming successor agreement (“Fish II”), show that more effective rules – without exemptions for those primarily responsible for the legal and illegal plundering of the oceans – are feasible in practice.

Ultimately, truly sustainable ocean governance will only succeed if political loopholes are closed and all States are genuinely willing to commit to clear and fair rules. Only with collective political will, a closure of loopholes and leadership from the major subsidisers will it be possible to deliver lasting sustainability and equity in the world’s oceans.


Francisco Marí epresents Brot für die Welt on the boards of the EU Long Distance Fleet Advisory Council (LDAC) and the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI), on the advisory board of the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements (CFFA), on the Stakeholder Forum of the German Alliance for Marine Research and on the International Council of the World Social Forum.
Contact: francisco.mari@brot-fuer-die-welt.de

This article was first published on the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements (CFFA) website.

Further reading:

WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

Rural 21 issue no 4/2021 on "Tailwind for sustainable artisanal fisheries"

Rural 21 Dossier on "Fisheries & aquaculture"